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The aim of  this paper is to describe how the 
Institutions of  the European Community work -
particularly those of the Common Market. It 
is written from the standpoint of  the technician 
rather than the lawyer - which is understandable 
since its author's daily task is to see that the 
Community's procedure is applied correctly and 
smoothly. 
It is difficult to say to what order the 
institutional system of the Community belongs. 
The Community is much more than an 
inter-governmental organization. Its Institutions 
have a personality of their own and have 
extensive powers. Nor does the Community form 
a "federal government" to which, in its spheres 
of competence, the national governments and 
parliaments might in some way be 
subordinated. In fact, Community officials have 
refrained from putting the Community's 
institutional system into any one of the 
categories defined by specialists in international 
law, leaving this task to future historians. If 
asked to define in a word the institutional 
system of  the Community, they prefer to reply 
simply that it is a "Community" system. • 
The Institutions 
The Rome Treaty lays down that the tasks entrusted to the 
European Economic Community - the Common Market-
shall  be  carried  out  by  four  Institutions:  the  European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and 
the Court of  Justice. 
The European Parliament comprises 142 members appointed 
by  the  six  national  Parliaments  from  among  their  own 
members. 
The Council consists of a Cabinet Minister from each of the 
member governments. The composition of the Council may 
thus vary according to the subjects on the agenda. Although 
the  Foreign  Minister  is  to  some  extent  regarded  as  his 
country's chief representative on the Council, the Ministers 
of Agriculture,  of Transport, of Finance,  etc.,  often take 
part in meetings, either alone or accompanying the Foreign 
Minister. 
The Commission consists of  nine members appointed for four 
years  by  unanimous  agreement  of the  six  governments. 
During the whole of their period of office, the members of 
the Commission must act in complete independence  both 
of their governments and of the Council of Ministers. The 
Council has no power to terminate the mandate of  a member 
of the Commission. Only the Parliament could procure the 
automatic resignation of the Commission by passing a vote 
of no confidence. 
The  Council  and  the  Commission  are  assisted  by  the 
Economic and Social Committee, a consultative body com-
posed of representatives of industry, farming, trade·unions, 
etc. In many matters the Council and the Commission must 
consult  the  Committee  before  they  can  take  a  formal 
decision.  The  Committee also  ensures  that both sides  of 
industry and other interests play their part in the develop-
ment of the Community. 
The Court of Justice consists of seven judges appointed for 
six years by agreement between the governments. It  ensures 
the rule of  law in the implementation of  the Treaty. 
Means of Community action 
•  There  are  several  ways  in which  the  Institutions,  acting 
executively through the Council and the Commission, can 
take the steps needed to achieve the tasks entrusted to them. 
•  First,  they  can  adopt Regulations.  Under the Treaty, 
Regulations have a general application; they are binding 
in every respect and directly applicable in each member 
state. 
•  They can also issue  Directives to one  or more of the 
member states. A Directive binds any member state to 
which it is addressed on the result to be achieved, while 
leaving it to the national authorities to decide  on the 
form and the means to be employed. 
•  They can take Decisions,  to be  addressed  either to a 
government, a firm or an individual. A Decision is bind-
ing in every respect on those to whom it is addressed. 
•  Finally,  they  can  formulate  Recommendations  or 
Opinions, which have no binding force. 
The Commission and the Council thus provide and trans-
mit the driving force  which  keeps  the entire institutional 
system of the Communities moving forward, and the way 
they are geared together is perhaps the most original aspect 
of  the Community system. At the same time the importance 
and the political authority of  the Commission, without which 
it could not play its full role vis-a-vis the Council, stem from 
the fact that the Commission is responsible to the Parliament 
alone. 
The Treaty gives the Commission extensive responsibilities 
which can best be outlined by describing it as: 
•  The guardian of  the Treaty; 
•  The executive body of  the Community; 
•  The initiator of Community policy and the body which 
gives expression to the interests of the Community as a 
whole. 
3 The Commission as 
guardian of the Treaty 
The Commission sees to it that the Treaty's provisions and 
the decisions taken by the Institutions are correctly applied. 
It is  responsible for maintaining an atmosphere of mutual 
confidence.  If the  Commission  does  its  job of watchdog 
properly, each member state can fulfil  its own obligations 
without mental reservation,  knowing that its partners are 
doing the same and that action will  be taken against any 
breach of the Treaty.  Conversely,  no state can plead any 
shortcoming of its partners as an excuse for not fulfilling its 
own obligations. If  there are any shortcomings, it is up to the 
Commission as an impartial body to make inquiries, to give 
an objective judgment and to prescribe what measures the 
state at fault must take to correct the situation. 
The Treaty lays down a strict procedure for preventing 
infringements. If the Commission considers that there has 
been a breach - and it can reach this conclusion either as a 
result of ex officio inquiry, or at the request of a member 
government,  or by investigating  complaints  from  private 
persons - it can call  on the state concerned to submit its 
comments or justify its action within a specified period (a 
month or six  weeks).  If the member  state  continues· the 
practice in question and if its comments do not induce the 
Commission to modify its view,  the Commission issues  a 
reasoned Opinion (avis motive) and fixes a time-limit within 
which the member state must comply with it. If  the member 
state does not comply within the time-limit laid down, the 
Commission may refer the matter to the Court of Justice, 
whose decision is binding both on the member state and on 
the Institutions. 
These provisions,  which give  considerable power to the 
Institutions, are in fact fully applied. In 1964, for example, 
the  Commission  dealt  with  24  alleged  infringements, 
investigation of  which gave rise to the following results: 
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In ten  cases  the  state  concerned  took  the  necessary 
corrective action at once, i.e. as soon as the Commission 
asked for comments. 
In three other, very complex, cases the comments of the 
state concerned led the Commission to look further into 
the matter, and the Commission has not so far taken the 
proceedings any further. 
In the eleven other cases the Commission has issued a 
reasoned Opinion. In four of these the states concerned 
have acted in conformity with this opinion. In the fifth 
case - a  more  complex  one - a  means  of solving  the 
special problems of  the state concerned, which led to the 
adoption of a solution out of line with the Treaty, will 
shortly be provided through the adoption of  Community 
rules  in the matter. The remaining  six  cases  were re-
ferred  by  the  Commission  to  the  Court  of Justice, 
which  subsequently  suspended  proceedings  in one  of 
them as the  state  involved  had  meanwhile taken the 
action  called  for.  The Court has  handed down three 
decisions  which  have  very  largely  upheld  the  Com-
mission's viewpoint. Two  cases  are still sub judice. 
In addition,  nearly 7  5 files  on suspected breaches were 
before the Commission at the end of 1964 and were dealt 
with during 1965. 
These figures  are large in comparison with the 50 cases 
brought before the Commission during the first five years of 
the Community's existence, from 1958 to the end of 1962. 
This is  because the provisions of the Treaty became more 
stringent  as  the several  stages  of its  implementation  are 
achieved,  while  the  extension  of Community  legislation 
multiplies  opportunities  for  mistakes.  Most  of the  cases 
during the early years were concerned with customs duties 
and  quotas.  Now there  are  as  many  which  concern  the 
application of  the agricultural regulations, and the variety of 
subject matter is likely further to increase in the future as 
other common policies come into force. The Commission's 
"policing" activities are therefore very unlikely to become 
fewer. 
Be this as it may, the measures that have given rise to these 
proceedings have been of  very limited economic significance. 
As a general rule there has been no question of deliberate 
action to escape obligations under the Treaty, but of differ-
ence  of interpretation  between  the  Commission  and  a 
member state, on which the Court has decided, or of errors 
which are almost inevitable when national administrations 
must adapt themselves  to the relevant  Community proce-
dures. It would be fair to say that the breaches committed 
so far have had no great effect on the correct implementation 
of  the provisions laid down in the Treaty. 
• 
• The Commission as 
executive body 
Considerable  executive  powers  are  already  vested  in  the 
Commission, and they will increase in the future. Both the 
Treaty and its implementing Regulations entrust the Com-
mission with the task and power of drawing up texts  (we 
might call them "administrative decrees") which give effect 
to the "European laws" contained in the Treaty or adopted 
by the Council. As the Council has made great use, particu-
larly  in  the  implementation  of the  common  agricultural 
policy, of the authority vested in it by the Treaty to confer 
such executive powers on the Commission, the number of 
Decisions or Regulations issued by the latter has increased 
considerably since 1962. 
Thus,  between  1958  and  July  1,  1962  (when  the  first 
agricultural market organizations began to function) a total 
of 55 Regulations came into force, of which only nine were 
executive  Regulations  issued  by  the  Commission.  In the 
three  months  between  July  1  and  October  1,  1962  the 
·•  establishment of the first agricultural market organizations 
(grains,  livestock  products,  fruit  and  vegetables)  led  the 
Commission alone to adopt 70 implementing Regulations. 
To give another example, in 1964 the Commission adopted 
a total of 124  Regulations,  almost all of which were con-
nected with the administration of the market organizations 
set up in 1962 and with the establishment of three further 
organizations (milk and milk products, beef and veal, and 
rice). 
The Commission must also take most of the individual 
Decisions  prescribed  by  the  Treaty  or its  implementing 
Regulations.  These  Decisions  may  be  addressed  to  a 
government in order,  for  example,  to  grant or to refuse 
tariff quotas,  or to adjust  or prohibit a  state aid,  or to 
authorize some departure from the Treaty under the safe-
guard clauses. They may also be aimed directly at a firm or 
individual:  the Regulation  on monopolies  and restrictive 
practices gives the Commission exclusive power to authorize 
economically justified agreements between firms. 
The Commission also has direct supervisory powers. For 
instance, in matters of restrictive practices or transport rates 
it can, on behalf of the Community, institute on-the-spot 
inquiries, take samples or make checks at the level  of the 
individual firm. 
When the Community was  first set up, the Commission 
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had  relatively  little  occasion  to  take  such  "individual 
~  Decisions".  Between  1958  and July  1962  they totalled no 
more than 200 - and most of them concerned tariff quotas. 
In this field too, the agricultural and cartel Regulations have 
considerably increased the Commission's work. For instance, 
the Commission must decide at regular intervals, and some-
times even from  day to day,  on the basis to be used for 
calculating  the  levies  on  grain,  rice  and  dairy  product 
imports. In addition to these almost daily decisions and the 
administration of  the tariff quotas (which formerly made up 
the bulk of the questions it had to settle) the Commission 
issued another 205  implementing Decisions in 1964 alone. 
By September 30, 1965, 78 proceedings in the cartel field, 
covering a total of 240 particular cases (some of them now 
settled) had been initiated by the Commission. 
The Commission's role in financial  management is  also 
considerable. From the beginning it has had to administer 
the European Social Fund (which had spent $31.7 million 
by  the  end of 1965  on retraining  and resettling  454,000 
Community  workers)  and  the  European  Development 
Fund. The latter, renewed in 1964 by the Yaounde Conven-
tion which associated  18  states in Africa and Madagascar 
with the Community, has  at its disposal  $730  million to 
allocate in development grants in the period 1964-69. 
Even greater amounts are to be allocated in the future to 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, 
also  administered  by  the  Commission.  The  sum of $537 
million is allocated to this Fund in the 1967 budget. In a few 
years,  when free  trade in farm products within the Com-
munity  is  an established  fact,  the  Fund will  have  at its 
disposal each year more than $1,500 million, which will be 
used  to enable the  Community to take over  the  cost  of 
supporting the agricultural markets in each member state 
and - one quarter of the total sum - to grant Community 
help for improving the structure of agriculture. 
The Management Committees 
We  have already noted that it was  the Council which,  by 
vesting further executive powers in the Commission, made 
possible this considerable extension of the latter's manage-
ment  activities.  In a  great number of cases  the  Council 
wished to be sure that these powers would be exercised in 
close liaison with the member governments. This led to the 
establishment with the Commission of various committees 
of government  representatives.  Some  of these  are purely 
advisory,  but the most original arrangement and the one 
which has proved most fruitful in practice is the "Manage-
ment Committee". 
Originally, the Management Committees were a compon-
ent  of the  agricultural  market  organization:  one  such 
5 committee was to operate for each main group of products. 
Because of  the success of  these Committees, the arrangement 
was later adopted in other sectors of Community activity. 
The procedure is  as follows:  the implementing measure 
to be taken by the Commission is  submitted as  a  draft to 
the  appropriate  Management  Committee,  which  gives  an 
opinion on it (the votes of members are weighted as in the 
Council). 
The Committee's opinion is not binding on the Commis-
sion, which, even after studying this opinion, has complete 
freedom to make and enforce its own decision. However, if 
the opinion has been given by weighted majority (12 votes 
out of 17)  and if the Commission does  not accept it, the 
matter is referred to the Council, which then has one month 
within which it may amend the Commission's decision. If, 
on the other hand, the Commission decision conforms with 
the Committee's opinion or if the Committee for lack of a 
weighted majority for any particular view, has failed to give 
an opinion, the Commission's decision is final and there is 
no appeal against it to the Council. 
Experience  to  date  has  shown  that  the  Management 
Committee  procedure  is  fully  satisfactory.  Between  July 
1962 and March 1965,  for instance, there were about 200 
meetings of the various Management Committees. Follow-
ing  their  discussions,  350  Commission  Regulations  or 
Decisions were adopted. It is even more interesting to note 
that  only  three  of these  measures  were  referred  to  the 
Council, which amended only one. 
This  record  gives  an  idea  of the  atmosphere  of co-
operation and confidence that has grown up in the Manage-
ment Committees between the Commission's staff and the 
officials of  the national administrations which have to apply 
subsequently the measures enacted by the Commission. 
A simple parallel will  serve to illustrate the role  of the 
Management Committees,  which  may  be  considered as  a 
sort of alarm system. When the Commission differs from an 
opinion  given  by  weighted  majority,  i.e.  one  with  the 
approval of  the bulk of  the representatives of  member states, 
this is a sign that a difficult situation or a serious problem 
exists.  It is  then  only  reasonable  that the  Council  itself 
should  be  able  to discuss  the matter.  The  fact  that this 
procedure is scarcely used bears witness to the effectiveness 
of the system and the excellent understanding between all 
concerned. 
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The Commission as 
initiator of 
Community policy 
The initiation of Community policy and the representation 
of the Community interest are no doubt the Commission's 
most  important  and  perhaps  most  original  tasks.  The 
Commission  acts  in  close  cooperation with  the  Council, 
so  that a  description  of this  aspect of the Commission's 
activities will serve also to explain the greater part of what 
the Council has to do and how it does it. 
The Common Market Treaty is frequently defined as an 
"outline"  treaty  (un  traite-cadre),  as  distinct  from  the 
Euratom Treaty and the Coal and Steel Treaty, which may 
be  called  "law-establishing  treaties"  (des  traites-lois). 
Whereas  the  latter two  Treaties  specify  exhaustively  the 
general regulations to be applied within relatively narrow 
sectors, the Treaty establishing the Common Market (apart 
from  its  "automatic" clauses  on the  removal  of customs 
duties and quotas) confines itself to indicating the general 
lines of Community policy in the main spheres of economic 
activity.  It  is  left  to  the  Community  Institutions-and 
particularly the Council and the Commission in cooperation 
with the Parliament - to elaborate the provisions that will be 
applied in the Community. 
In a way, everything connected with economic union was 
left blank in the Treaty, but these blanks can be filled in by 
the Community Institutions without any new treaties being 
concluded or new parliamentary ratification being obtained. 
The measures that the Institutions are empowered to take 
are real "European laws" that can be directly applied in all 
member states and may bring about far-reaching changes in 
the  sectors  of the economy  they concern.  The  European 
Regulations on agriculture adopted by the Council since the 
beginning of 1962 together form a body of law at least as 
significant as the entire Coal and Steel Treaty. 
It is worthwhile here to touch upon a comment that is often 
made - that the  Common  Market  Treaty is  less  "supra-
national"  or more intergovernmental, than  the Coal and 
Steel Treaty. In my opinion, this is really a case of optical 
illusion. The Coal and Steel Treaty laid down in full detail 
the implementing powers entrusted to the High Authority. 
In contrast, the powers of implementation of the Common 
Market Commission in all the fields  affected by the Rome 
Treaty will not be fully  known until all the Community's 
common  policies  have  been  adopted.  They  are  known 
already as  far  ~s  .  restrictive  practices  and  agriculture  ~re -~ 
concerned, and It Is clear that these powers are as extensive 
as those of  the High Authority. 
The  Paris  and  Rome  Treaties  are  based  on the  same principles and set up comparable institutional systems. But 
as the Common Market is in process of  continuous creation 
and leaves  scope for solutions to be found pragmatically 
and adapted individually to a given sector or situation, the 
Rome Treaty has perhaps been less alarming even to those 
people who have most reservations about the structure of  the 
Community. At the same time it makes the balance between 
the  powers  of national  governments  and  those  of the 
European Institutions more evident to those who  are just 
beginning to familiarize themselves with the Communities. 
The difficulties experienced by the Common Market in 1965 
in no way invalidate this view. 
The Commission-
Council dialogue 
These considerations can help in achieving a fuller under-
standing of the role of the Institutions in implementing the 
Treaty.  First  of all,  they  have  to create the structure of 
economic  union  in  Europe  out  of nothing.  The  Treaty 
provides the foundations, but the house itself has still to be 
built. Once the structure is there, the Institutions will also 
have to frame Community policy and apply it from day to 
day. To guide the whole of  this process the Treaty makes the 
Commission today the architect of the new  building and 
tomorrow the initiator of  the common policy. 
All  provisions  which  are general in scope  or of major 
importance require the approval of  the Council of  Ministers. 
With a few  specific  exceptions,  however,  the Council can 
only come to a decision on a precise proposal of the Com-
mission:  the  initiative  must  always  come  from  the 
Commission.  If the  Commission  does  not  submit  any 
proposals, the Council is  paralysed and the Community's 
progress halted. This is equally true in agriculture, transport, 
commercial  policy,  or  the  harmonization  of  national 
legislation. 
As a measure of the Commission's initiating activity one 
can take the year 1964,  when the Commission sent to the 
Council  156  proposals  and  96  other communications  of 
various kinds.  In the same year the Council adopted,  on 
proposals from the Commission, 80 Regulations, 14 Direc-
tives,  55  Decisions and an important Recommendation on 
the fight against inflation. 
The  submission  of  a  proposal  by  the  Commission 
initiates  the  dialogue  between  the  national  governments 
represented in the Council (the members of which express 
their  national  points  of view)  and  the  Commission - a 
"European" body called upon to express the interests of  the 
Community as a whole and to seek "European" solutions to 
common problems. It might  be  feared  that this  dialogue 
could be distorted if the Commission were in too weak a 
position vis-a-vis the governments - strong in their authority 
and the attributes of sovereignty. The Treaty balances the 
situation ingeniously. 
By the very fact of formulating the proposal which is to 
form the basis of the Council's discussion (and it is only on 
this  basis  that the  Council  can discuss)  the  Commission 
already acquires real influence. But there is more to it than 
this. Article 149 of the Treaty, which is perhaps one of the 
keys  to  the  Community's institutional system,  stipulates: 
"When,  pursuant  to  the  Treaty,  the  Council  acts  on  a 
proposal of  the Commission, it shall, where the amendment 
7 of such proposal is involved, act only by means of a unani-
mous vote." 
Provided it is unanimous, the Council of Ministers can 
therefore take a sovereign decision even against the Com-
mission's proposal. And this is  only reasonable, since the 
Council  then  expresses  the  common  standpoint  of  all 
member governments. On the other hand, a  decision may 
be agreed by a  majority vote only if it conforms with the 
Commission's proposal. In other words, if  the member states 
are not in agreement,  they  can take their decision  by  a 
majority vote only by accepting the Commission's proposal, 
which they have no power to amend. In such a case only the 
Commission itself can amend its own proposal. 
The  majority  rule  can  operate,  therefore,  when  the 
situation is as that: 
- either the Council adopts by majority vote the Commis-
sion proposal as it stands; 
or  it takes a different decision unanimously; 
- or it is unable to take any decision. 
Thus the Commission has real powers of negotiation in 
the Council. Discussion can be joined, and it is in fact joined, 
on ground chosen by the European body. 
This dialogue ha& a momentum of its own. The applica-
tion of  the majority rule-this we know from long experience 
in the Community - does not mean riding rough-shod over 
a minority. When formulating out its proposal in the first 
place the Commission will have taken into consideration the 
often widely  different interests  of the member states  and 
attempt to discern the general interest. As is normal in such 
a small "club", both the members of the Council and the 
Commission  prefer  to  agree  on  a  joint  position.  The 
possibility of a decision being taken by majority vote can, 
therefore, encourage a member to abandon an extreme or 
isolated  position,  while  the  concern  for  harmony  may 
encourage  the  Commission  and  those  members  of the 
Council who have accepted its proposal to make the neces-
sary efforts to bring about a rapprochement. In this way-
and practice has confirmed this rather paradoxical conclu-
sion - the majority voting rule makes unanimous adoption 
of proposals much easier and speedier. In this subtle game 
the Commission always has a determining role. 
Thus the Commission occupies a central position in the 
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Council, where it can permanently play the role of "honest 
broker" - or mediator between governments - at the same 
time as it supplies the drive and exerts the pressure needed to 
reach agreed solutions. 
The political consequences are still more important. The 
Commission's proposals are the expression of  a policy it has 
framed  with  no  other  consideration  in  mind  than  the 
common  interest  of  the  Community  as  a  whole.  The 
permanent status of  the Commission during its four years in 
office ensures the continuity of this policy, and the Council 
can only decide on proposals submitted by the Commission, 
which are the means of putting the policy into effect. It is 
therefore not possible for the Council to adopt contradictory 
proposals on different subjects through changing majorities, 
the  whims  of pressure  groups,  or struggles  for influence 
between governments. Without the consent of the Commis-
sion it is also impossible for a majority of the Council to 
impose on a country in the minority any measure that would 
gravely harm its  vital interests.  If the Commission really 
fulfils  its obligations, it cannot be party to such an action. 
Its intervention is therefore an important guarantee to the 
smaller states in particular, and these have always set great 
store by it. 
Unanimity and majority 
During the first two stages of  the transition period unanimity 
was  required  for  most  Council  decisions,  so  that  the 
procedure  described  above  applied  to  only  a  relatively 
limited number of matters.  The Community spirit of the 
Council members, and also the authority of  the Commission 
and the personal standing of its individual members, never-
theless ensured that discussion was jointed in a satisfactory 
manner in all cases and that the Commission was fully able 
· to play its part both as moving spirit and conciliator. 
At  a  time  when  the  transition  to  the  third  stage  on 
January  1,  1966,  would  have  permitted  a  considerable 
widening  of  the  possibilities  of  reaching  decisions  by 
majority vote, the application of the majority rule became 
the crux of  a crisis in the Community. Was it really possible, 
contended one government, that a member state should be 
placed in a minority when one of its vital interests was at 
stake? 
It is  not possible to answer such a  question simply by 
referring to the texts, any more than it is possible to give an  • 
objective definition of a "vital interest". Furthermore, if we  . 
limit ourselves to thinking in terms of interests, it is by no 
means impossible that, in matters where each member state •• 
has renounced its freedom of action in favour ofthe Com-
munity, a veto on a Community decision in the name of a 
national interest would infringe some vital interest of other 
member states, which are harmed through the paralysis of 
the Community. On the other hand, those who accept the 
Community system and have confidence in its internal logic, 
its Institutions, their rules  and their practices, can find  in 
them every guarantee that can reasonably be sought. 
The general interest of the Community must of necessity 
take account of  any vital interest of one of  its members. The 
Institutions therefore have a duty to take any such interest 
into full consideration. Moreover, the close union of  peoples 
which the Community is intended to establish would not be 
possible if  any of  the vital interests of  one of  its peoples were 
seriously affected.  Finally, the system of discussion in the 
Council which has just been described is conducive to the 
widest possible agreement.  From the opposite standpoint, 
even when there is unanimity, no member of a Community 
can ignore the general interest when deciding what consti-
tutes his own interest: unanimity in a Community cannot be 
equated with an unconditional right of veto. 
Thus in a living Community any abuse of  majority voting 
(and this would probably be equally true of the abuse of 
unanimity) is a theoretical risk which the constant strength-
ening  of internal links  through the  very  development of 
the  Community makes  increasingly  unlikely,  whereas  the 
possibility of  making majority decisions gives flexibility and 
drive to the whole system. 
· Confidence in the future, in the will to agree and in the 
wisdom of  the Institutions and governments, is therefore the 
only possible solution. And is not this the real meaning of 
the conclusions reached in Luxembourg on January 28, 1966, 
when the Council-the six  Foreign Ministers- recognized 
that the absence  of agreement between them on how the 
majority rule should be  applied was  no  obstacle to their 
further work in common? 
The European 
Parliament 
For the dialogue between Commission and Council to be 
genuine,  the  independence  of the  Commission  must  be 
guaranteed.  To this end,  as  already indicated,  the Treaty 
stipulates that the Commission shall be responsible to the 
European Parliament,  and to that Parliament alone.  The 
composition  of  the  Parliament  makes  it  essentially  a 
Community  body,  completely  integrated.  There  are  no 
national divisions, but only political groups organized at the 
European level. The Parliament exercises permanent control 
over the Commission, making sure that it respects its role 
as  representative  of the  Community interest,  and always 
prepared to call it to order should there be any reason to sus-
pect that it is yielding to canvassing by one or more of the 
governments. Furthermore, the Parliament must be expressly 
consulted on the Commission's main proposals before the 
Council takes any decision. 
The parliamentary committees play an important part in 
this field.  The Parliament cannot hold more than some six 
or seven  sessions  per year,  each lasting a  week.  Between 
sessions, most of  the parliamentary committees meet at least 
once.  Whatever subject it is  dealing with, a parliamentary 
committee invites the responsible member of the Executive 
to explain his standpoint - whether on decisions taken by 
the Executive or on proposals submitted to the Council, or 
on the attitude adopted by the Executive in the Council. 
The committees deal with matters in detail, and as their 
meetings are held in private they can be given complete and 
confidential information. Their work (which differs consider-
ably from that of the committees of the British Parliament) 
has  contributed  much  to  extending  the  influence  of the 
European Parliament on current affairs. 
The written questions that the members of the European 
Parliament can put to the Commission (and to the Council 
of Ministers) are also a means of parliamentary control that 
is being used more and more. In the 1965-66 parliamentary 
year,  129  written questions  were  put to the Commission. 
The  widening  of the  Community's  responsibilities  will 
eventually make it necessary for the powers of  the European 
Parliament to  be  widened  also,  and for its  representative 
character to be strengthened - for instance through election 
by direct universal suffrage.  In Community circles such a 
development is  felt  to be inevitable. 
Parliamentary control thus ensures the independence of 
the Commission,  thanks to which the Council enjoys  the 
advantages of  the majority principle while being preserved -
as far as is possible - from its few attendant risks. 
9 How the Commission 
works 
Such are the main tasks of the Institutions, the nature of 
their  relations  and  the  way  in  which  their  powers  are 
balanced. What are their working methods? 
The  Commission's  staff consists  of nine  Departments 
(directions generales), an Executive Secretariat (which has a 
coordinating role) and the Spokesman's Group. There are 
also  three  services  common to all three European  Com-
munities -the Legal Service, the Statistical  Office and the 
Information Service. 
The total staff of the  Commission  at present numbers 
about 3,300,  almost 900 of whom are officials in positions 
of responsibility (Class  A),  and a  large linguistic service. 
Together with the staff of the  European Parliament,  the 
Council  of Ministers  and the  Court of Justice,  the total 
nup1ber of Common Market officials is over 4,000. 
In the 1966 budget the operational expenses of the staff 
serving the Commission and the share in the cost of three 
other  Institutions  attributable  to  the  Common  Market 
amounted to $40 million. 
Each  of the  Commission's  nine  members  has  special 
responsibility for  one of the main spheres of Community 
activity (external relations, agriculture, social affairs, etc.), 
and has the corresponding Department under his authority. 
The Treaty lays down, however, that the Commission must 
act as a collegiate body with cabinet responsibility. In other 
words,  all  the  acts  that the  Treaty  or its  implementing 
regulations entrust explicity to the Commission (Regulations, 
Decisions, proposals to the Council, etc.) must be performed 
by the Commission as  a  whole.  The Commission cannot 
therefore  delegate  to  one  of its  members  powers  in the 
sphere of his special responsibility that would give  him a 
degree  of independence  comparable,  say,  with  that of a 
Cabinet Minister in his own department. 
In order that this collegiate system should not paralyse 
the Commission through burden of work, frequent use  is 
made of what is  known as  the "written procedure".  The 
members of the Commission receive the dossier and a draft 
decision  on a  matter under  discussion;  if they  have  not 
submitted reservations or objections within a fixed  period 
(generally  a  week),  the proposal is  deemed  to have  been 
adopted by the Commission as a whole.  More than 1,700 
decisions of all kinds were reached during 1964. 
Consequently,  only  questions  of particular importance 
are placed on the agenda for Commission meetings, which 
take up one whole day each week. 
For  the  most  delicate  questions  the  members  of the 
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Commission meet alone, with no official present except the 
Executive Secretary and his Deputy. For ordinary matters--
or those of a technical nature - the responsible officials can 
be called in. Although Commission decisions can be taken 
by  a  majority  vote,  most  of them  are  unanimous.  The 
solidarity of  the members of  the Commission and the under-
lying  unity of their views,  which transcend differences  in 
character  and  background,  make  quite  a  considerable 
impression  on anyone  who  follows  the  activities  of this 
body. It  is therefore rather rare for matters to be put to the 
vote in the Commission, and when this has happened the 
minority has always considered itself bound by the majority 
decision. 
Drawing up decisions and proposals 
When the Commission draws up its own Decisions and the 
proposals it submits to the Council, it follows  two clearly 
distinguishable courses: firstly,  it defines the main lines of 
policy which it intends to follow in a given field - the Com-
mission in its political role; secondly, it chooses the ways and 
means of putting such a policy into practice - the Commis-
sion in its technical role. 
When the Commission has to lay down the main lines of 
policy,  it  first  enters  into  consultation  on the  broadest 
possible basis, seeking the opinions of  governments, officials 
and private organizations. Then it decides its attitude, with 
the  assistance  of its  own  staff,  but of no  one  else.  This 
process  takes place in the course of often numerous and 
lengthy working meetings, with weeks of reflection between 
one draft proposal and the next. This is how the Commission 
prepared documents as important as the Commission's first 
memorandum on European problems after the breakdown 
of the 1958  Free Trade Area negotiations, the proposal to 
speed up the implementation of  the Treaty, the memoranda 
on the common agricultural policy  and on the transport 
policy,  the  proposals  on the renewal  of the  Convention 
of Association  with  the  associated  states  in Africa  and 
Madagascar, the proposals on a common grain price level, 
and so on. 
On the other hand, when the Commission has to decide 
on the broad lines and settle the ways and means of  reaching 
a decision of definite political importance, it regularly calls 
on experts from the six member countries. In such a case the 
appropriate departments convene and preside over meetings 
of government experts appointed by  each of the national 
administrations. These experts do not formally commit their • • 
governments but, as they are aware of the latters' interests 
and opinions, they perform a useful function in guiding the 
Commission in its search for solutions that are technically 
accurate and generally acceptable to the six governments. 
These  meetings  of experts  are held very  frequently.  In 
1964, for instance, about 1,300 meetings of this kind were 
organized by the Commission on the most varied subjects 
connected  with  the  implementation  of the Treaty.  Every 
year this procedure thus provides an increasing number of 
civil  servants  from  the  member  countries  with  a  truly 
"European education". 
These  meetings  also  enable contact to  be made  at the 
administrative  level  between  Community  officials  and 
government  officials.  They  are  supplemented  by  many 
consultative meetings organized by the Commission or its 
various  departments,  with,  for  example,  leaders  of the 
Community-wide  groupings  of trade  unions,  employers' 
associations, farmers' unions, and traders' associations. 
Some of these committees are on a permanent footing. 
The Council has for instance, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission,  set  up  the  Short-term  Economic  Policy 
Committee, the Budgetary-policy Committee and the Com-
mittee for Medium-term Economic Policy, all composed of 
senior  government  representatives.  The  committees  deal-
ing with occupational training and the free  movement of 
workers are mixed (government experts and delegates from 
both sides of industry). Finally, the Commission itself has 
set up with the leaders of all the various interests concerned 
several  advisory  committees  on,  for  example,  the  main 
classes  of agricultural produce or for the study of certain 
social problems. 
The results  of all this preparatory work are eventually 
laid  before  the  Commission,  which  has  to take the final 
decision. 
This, then, is how proposals submitted to the Council by 
the Commission are drawn up. The same procedure is also 
very often used to frame Regulations or Decisions which the 
Commission can itself adopt, but in the preparation of  which 
it tries to ensure the participation of  the national administra-
tions. 
How the Council of 
Ministers works 
When the Council has before it a Commission memorandum 
of general scope or a proposal on a well-defined subject, it 
entrusts the preparation of  its discussions either to an ad hoc 
committee  of senior  officials  (for  example,  the  Special 
Committee  on Agriculture)  or to  one  of its  permanent 
committees (groupes  de  travail), of which there is  one for 
each main branch of the Community's activities. The work 
of  these bodies is coordinated by the Committee of Perma-
nent Representatives, a committee of the ambassadors of 
the six member countries to the Community, which prepares 
the  work  of the Council  by  functioning  as  a  committee 
of ministerial deputies. 
The  Commission  is  represented  at all  meetings  of the 
permanent and special committees, and of the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives, so  that the dialogue begun 
at the level of the national experts can be  continued with 
officials duly appointed by their governments. 
Council decisions  may  only  be  taken by the  Ministers 
themselves, though on less important questions and where 
unanimous  agreement  has  been  reached  between  the  six 
Permanent Representatives  and the representatives of the 
Commission, the decision is taken by the Council without 
further discussion. 
On the other hand, all questions of major importance or 
of political  significance  are  thoroughly  discussed  in  the 
Council by the Ministers and the members of the Commis-
sion, who take part in the Council meetings as of  right. It  is 
at this point that the rules of Article 149 described above, 
are applied. 
These meetings are not a pure formality - as is sometimes 
the  case  with  ministerial  meetings  in other international 
organizations - but working sessions at which discussion is 
often prolonged and fierce  and the final  result for a long 
time uncertain. Sessions of the Council are moreover very 
frequent  and often protracted.  In 1964,  for  example,  the 
Council held  36  sessions,  lasting in all  67  days.  When a 
decision  is  near  on  a  particularly  thorny  problem,  the 
Council may settle down to a "marathon session". Every-
body in the Community remembers the marathon session 
on the agricultural regulations which  went  on for nearly 
three weeks at the tum of the year 1961-62. And that was 
not the only one of  its kind .... 
11 The  Community 
style 
These,  then,  are  the  rules  and the  facts  that seem  most 
typical of  the functioning of  the Common Market's Council 
of Ministers and Commission and - more generally - of the 
Community as a whole. 
The style of our Institutions in Brussels is best conveyed 
by three of  their salient features: 
The Institutions, and particularly the Commission, are 
not inward-looking.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  focal 
points  for  the  constant  interchange  of opinions  and 
suggestions  of  governments  and  civil  servants,  of 
members  of the  European  Parliament,  and of repre-
sentatives of labour and managements. 
There  are  strict  legal  rules  that  must  be  rigorously 
respected,  but  at the  same  time  the  maintenance  of 
permanent  contracts  creates  that common  spirit  and 
mutual confidence which ensure the necessary flexibility. 
Private  organizations,  parliamentary  representatives, 
national civil servants and ministers have real confidence 
in the impartiality of  the Commission. 
After nine years' experience of the Common Market, and 
even  longer  experience  of the  European  Coal  and Steel 
Community,  and after  several  crises  weathered-and the 
most recent was also the most serious - it would seem that 
the efficacity of the Community system, the strength of the 
Institutions and the roots they have taken among the peoples 
of the Community  are  proved  beyond  any  doubt.  True, 
the  pace  at which  the  Community  advances  has  always 
depended on the will of  the member governments and of  the 
peoples composing it. However, as long as respect for the 
Rome Treaty remains a common foundation of the policy 
of the member states, we  may rest assured that there will 
be no difficulties, however  great,  which it will  not in the 
last resort be possible to resolve,  as  we  move forward to 
the complete establishment of the European Communities. 
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